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UPPOSE THAT WHAT I SHALL CALL the instrumental principle is 
true: people have reason to take the known, necessary means to the 
ends they intend.1 Then it appears to follow that your intentions to 
pursue ends, however you arrived at them, automatically give you reasons 
to take certain means. This idea might seem appealing: intuitively, people 
who fail to take the means to their ends are in violation of the reasons for 
action that they have, and that is why we describe them as practically 
irrational.2 But it is also deeply problematic, because it makes reasons for 
action too easy to come by. No reason to drink the petrol in that glass? 
Just adopt the bizarre intention of filling your stomach with any old liquid 
and suddenly you will have reason to do so! I will call this the Bootstrapping 
Problem.3 
In his much-discussed paper “The Myth of Instrumental Rational-
ity,” Joseph Raz sees the Bootstrapping Problem and concludes that the 
instrumental principle must be false: your actual ends and intentions do 
not give you reasons to take the means to fulfilling them.4 Raz’s suggested 
alternative is, roughly speaking, the principle that you have reason to take 
the means to just those ends that you have undefeated reason to have. 
But there is an immediate difficulty with this alternative sort of proposal: 
it leaves unexplained the phenomenon of cleverness and its opposite. Intui-
tively, people who take the means to ends they have no reason to pursue 
(or good reason not to) seem to be rational in a certain way (a way we 
may call clever), while people who fail to take the means to their ends, even 
when they lack any good reason to have those ends, seem to display a 
distinctive form of irrationality (let us call them obtuse). If the instrumental 
principle is false and only Raz’s alternative principle is true, then we seem 
to have no grounds for saying that clever people do any better at follow-
ing the reasons they have than obtuse people do. So how are we to ex-
plain the intuition that it is more rational to be clever than to be obtuse? 
We face an apparent dilemma: If we say that you have reason to take 
the means to the ends you actually have, the Bootstrapping Problem 
                                                
1 I am especially grateful to two anonymous referees for JESP and to Selim Berker, 
Sharon Berry, Rachael Briggs, Iskra Fileva, Warren Goldfarb, David Gray, Christine 
Korsgaard, Japa Pallikkathayil, Derek Parfit, Joseph Raz, T M Scanlon, James Shaw, 
Jonathan Way, Ralph Wedgwood and Michael Young for their helpful comments. The 
initial context for discussion of these issues was made possible by Christine Korsgaard’s 
seminar on practical reason at Harvard in 2007, funded by the Mellon Foundation. 
2 I will use the phrase “the means” as shorthand for “the known, necessary means” to the 
end, since it is not practically irrational not to take a means one does not know about, 
nor to not take a sufficient means if one takes some equally good alternative sufficient 
means. These qualifications yield a weak but plausible version of the instrumental 
principle. A complete account of instrumental rationality would presumably include 
further principles as well. 
3 Michael Bratman discusses the problem of “bootstrap rationality” in his “Intention and 
Means-End Reasoning,” The Philosophical Review 90, no. 2 (April 1981): 252-265. 
4 Joseph Raz, “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philoso-
phy 1, no. 1 (2005). 
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threatens. If we say instead that you have reason to take the means just to 
ends you should have, there seems to be no room left for explaining what 
is rational about good means-end reasoning to bad ends: the rationality of 
cleverness.5 
I advocate a scope distinction that promises to rescue the instrumen-
tal principle from the Bootstrapping Problem. According to the propo-
nents of the wide-scope reasons approach with whom I agree, the instrumental 
principle is ambiguous because the deontic (“reason”) operator in it can 
take either wide or narrow scope with respect to an implicit conditional (I 
will explain this more fully below, in section 1). The instrumental princi-
ple is held to be true only on the reading in which the deontic operator 
takes wide scope with respect to the conditional. But this reading is not 
the one that entails reasons of the kind that raise the Bootstrapping 
Problem.6  
                                                
5 Raz develops his own rather sophisticated answer to this problem that unfortunately I 
cannot delve into here. Some other readers might think that what I have identified as the 
Bootstrapping Problem is not a problem at all – is it so crazy to think that we have very 
weak reasons to take the means to even our most bizarre and irrational ends? (cf. James 
Maffie, “Naturalism and the Normativity of Epistemology,” Philosophical Studies 59, no. 3 
(July 1990): 6-9.) A proponent of this view must face the difficult task of accounting for 
and accommodating these weak reasons, as well as the claimed difference in strength 
between the instrumental reasons that arise from our “bad” ends and those that arise 
from our “good” ends. And analogous problems to those mentioned here still arise: it is 
hard to explain why a merely “clever” person can easily seem just as rational, in a certain 
way, as a fully rational person, if it is assumed that the reasons the clever person is 
preoccupied by are so weak as to be obviously practically insignificant. 
6 The wide-scope reasons approach was developed by John Broome and Jay Wallace. 
See John Broome, “Normative Requirements,” Ratio 12, no. 4 (December 1999): 398-
419; R. J. Wallace, “Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason,” Philosophers’ 
Imprint 1, no. 3 (2001): 1-26. 
Broome does not use the term “wide-scope reasons” in his 1999 paper “Norma-
tive Requirements.” He claims there that what counts in favor of intending to take what 
you believe to be the necessary means to an end you intend is a wide-scope ought or, as 
he calls it, a “normative requirement.” Moreover, he argues that we must avoid the 
mistake of “confusing normative requirements with reasons” (p. 398). It might appear 
from this remark that he strongly opposed the instrumental principle as I represent it, in 
terms of wide-scope reasons. However, this interpretation is misleading. Broome defines 
another normative relation in that paper that he calls a “normative recommending,” 
which is like a normative requirement except that it makes a “slack,” rather than a 
“strict” demand on you – that is, you may not be failing to see to something you ought 
to see to even if you fail to do what it counts in favor of. Normative recommendings 
bear the same relation of slackness to normative requirements as ordinary, narrow-scope 
reasons bear to ordinary narrow-scope oughts. So Broome’s concept of a “normative 
recommending” is just what I call a “wide-scope reason.” Confusion may arise because 
Broome uses the term “reason” exclusively to refer to narrow-scope reasons, but this 
restriction is arbitrary. Moreover, if the plausible thesis that, if you ought to do some-
thing, then you have a reason to do it is true, then it will follow that all normative 
requirements – including what Broome (1999) presents as a genuine instrumental norma-
tive requirement – entail the existence of my wide-scope reasons. 
In more recent work, Broome preferred to describe what he had previously called 
“normative requirements” as “requirements of rationality,” because he came to think it 
an open question whether rational requirements are normative, i.e., whether necessarily, 
if rationality requires of you to F, you have a (justifying) reason to F (see, for example, 
“Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?,” Philosophical Issues 15, no. 1 (October 2005): 325.) 
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Most of this paper is taken up defending the wide-scope reasons ap-
proach against an objection Raz makes to it in “The Myth of Instrumen-
tal Rationality.” Raz claims there that the Bootstrapping Problem arises 
even on the wide-scope reason approach: on both available readings of the 
instrumental principle, he argues, it entails that our intending an irrational 
end always gives us a reason to take the means to it (I will expound his 
argument in sections 2–4). I will argue (in sections 5–7) that Raz’s argu-
ment only looks plausible due to a natural but rather serious misunder-
standing of a certain class of wide-scope reason claims – namely, claims 
of the form “S has a reason to p or to q.” 
My argument clarifies and resolves an important debate between Raz 
and John Broome. Broome has raised a separate objection to Raz’s argu-
ment which is not obviously successful because it relies heavily on intui-
tions about which reasons we have in particular cases. Broome essentially 
argues that a central principle that Raz is committed to, which Raz calls 
the “Facilitative Principle,” has counterintuitive implications about which 
reasons we have. For example, the Facilitative Principle implies that if 
you have an undefeated reason to avoid killing yourself, and you could 
avoid feeling hungry this afternoon either by eating a sandwich or by 
killing yourself, then you have not only a reason to eat a sandwich, but 
also a reason to kill yourself.7 Although Broome thinks this is obviously 
false, Raz claims that his intuitions differ from Broome’s, and he is willing 
to bite the bullet in the disputed cases.8 While I am largely in agreement 
with Broome, I aim to build a more compelling defense of the wide-
scope reasons approach here. By clarifying what we normally mean when 
we claim that “S has a reason to p or to q,” my argument not only estab-
lishes that the wide-scope reasons approach is immune to the Bootstrap-
ping Problem, but also resolves the clash of intuitions between Raz and 
Broome. I will show that Raz’s intuitions about the particular cases, and 
his acceptance of the Facilitative Principle, rest on a logical mistake (sec-
tion 8). I will then show that the same error also underlies a second 
objection to the wide-scope approach, according to which it provides too 
liberal an account of the instrumental reasons that we have (section 9). 
Showing that these two objections to the wide-scope approach to the 
instrumental principle fail is significant (as I explain in section 10). The 
wide-scope reasons approach, if it can be defended, allows us to (i) main-
tain the intuition that a practically irrational agent is irrational because he 
fails to respond properly to the reasons that he has, (ii) readily explain 
why instrumentally irrational agents are irrational in the same way in one 
                                                                                                                
Broome’s more recent view thus leaves open the possibility that there are requirements 
of rationality even if there are no wide-scope reasons, such as those given by my instru-
mental principle. We need not adjudicate here whether Broome was correct in making 
that revision to his view, since even the later Broome shares my interest in defending the 
possibility of what I call instrumental wide-scope reasons (and thus the openness of the 
question of whether rational requirements are normative) against Raz’s line of attack. 
7 John Broome, “Have We Reason To Do As Rationality Requires? A comment on 
Raz,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1, no. 1 (2005). 
8 Joseph Raz, “Instrumental Rationality: A reprise,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1, 
no. 1 (April 2005): 3-4. 
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important respect – whether or not they have reason to have the ends 
that they have – and (iii) cut off a well-known and seemingly forceful 
objection to the idea that rationality might be purely instrumental, accord-
ing to which instrumental reasons arise only when normative force is 
“transmitted” from ends there is non-instrumental reason to have to the 
means to those ends.9 
 
1. The Wide-Scope Reasons Approach 
 
Let me begin by very briefly showing how the wide-scope reasons ap-
proach to the instrumental principle is supposed to avoid the Bootstrap-
ping Problem. Wide-scope reasons can be explained as reasons that constrain 
our attitudes and actions by governing combinations of them.10 We repre-
sent this logically by containing a connective within the scope of the 
reason operator. Thus, a wide-scope conditional reason says that we have 
reason to make it the case that (if the antecedent is true, then the conse-
quent is true). We can characterize the instrumental principle as a wide-
scope conditional reason this way: you have reason(if you intend the end, 
then take the means).11 
As a matter of logic, wide-scope conditional reasons do not allow for 
factual detachment by modus ponens, which is to say that if one has a wide-
scope conditional reason of the form: reason(to A if P), it does not fol-
low generally from this and the fact that P, by modus ponens, that one has 
reason(to A). (The latter is a reason that we can call narrow-scope, because 
it has no connective embedded within its scope). The use of modus ponens 
is blocked here because the conditional is embedded inside the scope of 
an operator. Compare the following invalid argument: 
                                                
9 Christine Korsgaard presses this objection in her “The Normativity of Instrumental 
Reason,” in Ethics and Practical Reason, Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (eds.) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), 215–54. 
10 See Jay Wallace, “Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason,” 17. 
11 Some philosophers have expressed semantic concerns about wide-scope normative 
claims like “reason(if A then B).” For example, it has been claimed that words like 
“ought” (and, by extension, terms like “reason”) necessarily express relations between 
agents and actions (and not propositions or other entities that admit of a conditional form) 
(cf. Mark Schroeder, “The Scope of Instrumental Reason,” Philosophical Perspectives 18, no. 
1 (2004): 342-344.). I cannot fully address that objection here, but it may be worth 
clarifying that I understand the “reason” in constructions like reason(if A then B) in this 
paper as shorthand for “reason to make it the case that,” and whatever is inside the 
parentheses as shorthand for a complete proposition. So “You have reason(if A then 
B)” means that you have reason to make it the case that a certain proposition is true – 
namely, the proposition that if A then B. 
An anonymous referee for JESP raised the different concern that when we say that 
there is a reason to  , we can legitimately ask what fact constitutes or gives you that 
reason, but that this does not seem to be the case for what I am calling wide-scope 
reasons. On the narrow-scope view, if you have a reason to take a means M, we could 
say that your reason to take M is the fact that you intend E, or that you have undefeated reason 
to intend E, or something of the sort. According to the wide-scope view, you have a 
reason(to M if you intend E), but what fact, one might ask, is that reason provided by? 
My answer is straightforward: the fact that M is the means to E is the fact that gives you 
the reason(to M if you intend E). 
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Necessarily(something is on the mat if the cat is on the mat). 
The cat is on the mat. 
⇒ Necessarily(something is on the mat). 
 
If the instrumental principle is itself expressed in terms of a wide-scope 
conditional reason, we cannot simply detach a narrow-scope reason to 
take the means based on the fact that we actually intend a certain end. So 
the wide-scope reading of the instrumental principle, it seems, avoids the 
Bootstrapping Problem. 
 
2. An Objection: Raz’s Detachment Argument 
 
Raz objects that the following argument is valid. If it is valid, then even 
the wide-scope instrumental principle entails narrow-scope bootstrapped 
reasons to take the means to the ends one actually intends. (I quote the 
premises directly including 1B, Raz’s interpretation of the wide-scope 
instrumental principle.):12 
 
The Detachment Argument 
(1B) One has reason(to do M if one intends to do E and M is the means to E). 
(2B) One intends to do E and M is the means to E. 
 ⇒ One has reason to do M. 
 
At first glance, it might seem that the argument above works by straight-
forward factual detachment by modus ponens, with 2B providing the factual 
premise. But since, as we have seen, this move is not permissible here, we 
need an alternative explanation of how Raz thinks the conclusion is to be 
derived. 
One way the Detachment Argument might be thought to work is by 
an application of Raz’s Facilitative Principle. He explains this principle as 
saying that, when you have an undefeated reason to perform a certain 
action (a “source action”), you have reason to perform each (though not 
more than one) of the possible alternative “plans” that would “facilitate” 
its performance.13 So our “source reasons” for performing actions, ac-
cording to Raz, also give us “facilitative reasons” for taking any of the 
                                                
12 Raz, “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,” 12. 
13 Ibid., 5-6. I have disambiguated Raz’s statement of the Facilitative Principle slightly by 
using the phrase “each (though not more than one)” where Raz uses the words “any one 
(but only one).” This disambiguation opposes Broome’s interpretation of Raz’s princi-
ple, according to which the Facilitative Principle entails the existence of a reason to take 
only one plan of action – presumably the best plan that will facilitate the end (Broome, 
“Have We Reason To Do As Rationality Requires?,” 7.) That Raz intends the former 
interpretation, rather than the latter, is obvious from a footnote in which he remarks: “I 
may have a duty to be in Oxford by noon, and buying a train ticket will facilitate getting 
there. But it does not follow from these facts alone that I have a duty to buy a train ticket, 
only that I have a [facilitative] reason to do so. The fact that there may be alternative plans 
facilitating fulfilment of my duty, that others may be preferable, etc., may explain this 
diminution in stringency.” (Joseph Raz, “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,” 13; fn. 
18 [my italics].) Raz means the Facilitative Principle to entail a reason to take even a 
suboptimal plan so long as it would facilitate the performance of the source action. 
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possible plans that would lead to our taking those actions. For example, if 
I have undefeated reason to drink a cup of coffee, I thereby have facilita-
tive reasons (insofar as these are possible ways for me to accomplish this) 
to head to the coffee shop with some cash in my pocket, to boil the kettle 
and put some instant in a cup, to grind some beans and start the percola-
tor, and so on. 
 
(Facilitative Principle) When one has an undefeated reason to perform an action, one has rea-
son to perform each (but only one) of the possible alternative plans that would facilitate its per-
formance. 
 
The complex “action” that the wide-scope instrumental principle rec-
ommends is: “take M if you intend E,” which is logically equivalent to: 
“take M ∨ not intend E.” But Raz does not think of taking M, or of not 
intending E, as “plans” that “facilitate” your performance of this “ac-
tion.” What we are concerned with in this case, strictly speaking, is not 
the relationship between a source action and facilitative reasons, but the 
relationship between a source action (or a state of affairs) and reasons to 
perform some possible actions or bring about some states of affairs 
which would be sufficient to constitute bringing the source action about.14 
What Raz needs specifically to fill in the argument here is another princi-
ple he accepts – namely that “if one has reason to bring about a disjunc-
tive state of affairs, then one has reason to bring about either of the 
disjuncts.”15 Let us call this the principle of Distribution of Reasons over 
Disjunction (DRD): 
 
(DRD) If one has reason to bring about a disjunctive state of affairs, then one has reason to 
bring about each (but only one) of the disjuncts. 
 
DRD is not an application of the Facilitative Principle, but rather a related 
claim that depends on essentially the same reasoning, as Raz himself 
confirms: “The inference pattern I relied on in the [Detachment Argu-
ment] is fundamental to practical reasoning: People have reason to do 
what will bring them into conformity with reasons which apply to them. I 
also relied on it in arguing for … the validity of the facilitative princi-
ple.”16  
What, then, is the inference pattern Raz relies on to generate both 
the Detachment Argument and the Facilitative Principle? It is, I believe, 
the following: If you have reason to bring about some state of affairs A, 
and you can bring about A either by doing B or by doing C, then we may 
infer that you have reason to do B and you have reason to do C (but no 
reason to do both) in virtue of your reason to bring about A. I will call 
the principle underlying this inference “Liberal Transmission” for short, 
because it suggests that reasons are always “transmitted” from a source 
reason to every possible way of bringing about the state of affairs it is a 
reason for. It entails both DRD and the Facilitative Principle. 
                                                
14 Ibid., 18. 
15 Raz, “Instrumental Rationality: A reprise,” 2. 
16 Ibid., 3. 
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(Liberal Transmission) If you have reason to bring about A, and you can bring about A either 
by doing B or by doing C, then you have reason to do B and you have reason to do C (but no rea-
son to do both) in virtue of your having reason to bring about A. 
 
We will come back later to discuss whether Liberal Transmission is in fact 
true. Let us for the moment put this question aside and assume for the 
sake of the argument that the weaker DRD is true. The wide-scope in-
strumental principle (1B) says that one has reason to avoid being in a 
situation of (intending to do E and not taking M). This reason can also be 
understood as a reason to bring about the truth disjunctive proposition 
(one does not intend E ∨ one takes M). By DRD, we can draw from it 
the implication that one has reason to take M. But this would be boot-
strapping, so by modus tollens, according to Raz, we should conclude that 
the wide-scope instrumental principle is false. 
There are, I believe, a number of serious difficulties with this argu-
ment. Before explaining them, I want to make sure that the reader will 
grant that I have represented Raz’s Detachment Argument properly. Here 
is the core of Raz’s explanation, in his own words:17  
 
(1B) does state that one has a reason … it is a reason to avoid being in a situation 
in which one would be in breach of that reason. And one would be in breach of it 
if one both intends E and fails to do M. There are two ways to avoid being in that 
situation. One is to abandon the intention to do E. The other is to do M. So one 
has both a reason to do M and a reason to abandon one’s intention to do E 
(though no reason to do both, because once one does one of them the reason to 
do the other lapses). That means that, so long as M is the means to E and one in-
tends to do E, one has reason to do M. By doing M, when it is the means to E, 
one acts in a way that puts one on the right side of reason. By doing M, one con-
forms to the reason stated in (1B). It follows that one has reason to do M.18  
 
According to this passage, the wide-scope instrumental principle (1B) 
gives us reason to pursue each (but not both) of the two ways of satisfy-
ing it – taking the means or abandoning the end. Raz’s claim that one 
“has both a reason to do M and a reason to abandon one’s intention to 
do E” represents an assertion of DRD, apparently motivated by his 
acceptance of Liberal Transmission (Raz does not offer a further argu-
ment for either of these principles). Now, since one obviously has no 
reason to abandon the end and then take the means, or vice versa, it is 
natural to add that “once one does one of them the reason to do the 
other lapses.” 
                                                
17 It should be noted, in fairness, that Raz’s argument here may be partially founded 
upon a claim that Wallace makes (mistakenly, I think) in defense of a wide-scope in-
strumental principle. Wallace claims that “you can comply with [the instrumental princi-
ple] either by giving up the intention to [pursue the end], or by forming the intention to 
[take the means]” (Wallace, “Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason,” 17.) 
While I defend the wide-scope instrumental principle against Raz’s argument here, I 
seek to draw no conclusions about its success as a reductio of Wallace’s position in that 
paper. 
18 Raz, “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,” 12. 
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3. A Partial Reply, and the All Possible Ends Problem  
 
I want to begin to reply to Raz’s argument by first noticing a problem 
with that last point. Even if we were to grant DRD, so that we can con-
clude from the instrumental principle that one has both a reason to take 
M and to abandon one’s intention to do E, it would be a mistake to 
additionally conclude that once one has done one of these, one simulta-
neously loses one’s reason to do the other. Nothing in the argument Raz 
offers establishes that, once we have abandoned our intention to do E, 
we lose our reason to take M, or that we only gain the reason to take M 
once we have adopted the intention to do E. (1B) states a wide-scope 
reason, and wide-scope reasons are not detachable by modus ponens. This 
means that our actual ends and intentions make no difference to the 
claim that (1B) makes on us.  
To see this point more clearly, suppose that I have an undefeated 
non-instrumental reason to intend to look after my teeth. Also suppose 
that when I realize that looking after my teeth requires a visit to the 
dentist, I become irrationally frightened. I decide that I am not going to 
take the means to that end, and I abandon my previous intention to look 
after my teeth. According to Raz’s argument, by abandoning the intention 
I will have correctly observed the reasons that I have in the light of (1B), 
and I will no longer have a reason to visit the dentist. But this claim must 
be false. Here’s why: Ex hypothesi, I still have a reason to intend to look 
after my teeth (though I do not intend to do so). And (1B) still presents 
me with the following instrumental reason, since visiting the dentist is a 
necessary means to looking after my teeth: I have reason(if I intend to 
look after my teeth, then I visit the dentist). The only way of acting in 
accordance with both of my reasons would be to intend to look after my 
teeth and visit the dentist, therefore it is obvious enough that their com-
bination entails that I have a reason to do this, and hence a reason to visit 
the dentist.19,20 That is, (1B) combines with my non-instrumental reason to 
give me a reason to visit the dentist, even though I actually lack the inten-
                                                
19 It is important that the two reasons at play in this case do not conflict; if they did, they 
would not have combined in the way indicated here. Reasons might conflict by recom-
mending incompatible actions or beliefs or, more generally, by being such that the 
justification for one undermines the justification for the other, or by being such that 
acting (believing) in accordance with one undermines the justification for also acting 
(believing) in accordance with the other. Perhaps I have some reason (e.g., testimony) to 
believe that P, and I have some other reason (e.g., I have constructed a reductio, but I 
might have made a mistake) to believe that If P, a contradiction follows. These two reasons 
do not jointly give me reason to believe that (P and a contradiction); the fact that two 
claims together entail a contradiction means that the reason for one belief counts against 
believing the other. Note that the fact that two reasons conflict need not necessarily be 
evident from their logical form. 
20 This claim implicitly rests on the principle that a reason to perform a conjunction of 
actions entails reason to perform each of the conjuncts, which seems uncontroversial. 
Note that its truth is compatible with either response to the controversial question of 
whether one has any reason to bring about necessary side effects of actions one has 
reason to perform. 
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tion of looking after my teeth.21 This shows that my actual intentions and 
ends make no difference to the reasons (1B) provides me with, at least in 
this sort of case.22 
If we take instrumental rationality to consist in coherence between 
my intended ends and the means I take, then I am not, of course, instru-
mentally irrational in failing to visit the dentist in the case where I no 
longer intend to look after my teeth. But my failure to visit the dentist 
nevertheless indicates my failure to follow the reasons that I have. It 
remains the case, even after I have abandoned my intention to look after 
my teeth, that, if I were to follow the reasons that I have, then I would 
intend to look after my teeth. Further, it remains the case that if I were to 
follow the reasons that I have, then I would visit the dentist as a means to 
looking after my teeth. In this sense, I still have a reason, in the light of 
(1B), to visit the dentist, no matter what my current intentions. 
It might be wondered what reasons (1B) would provide me with in 
the absence of further, non-instrumental reasons.23 On one type of 
Humean instrumentalist view, the only kind of reasons we have are in-
strumental reasons, and our ultimate ends are unanswerable to reason. 
Suppose an instrumentalist of this type accepts the wide-scope characteri-
zation of the instrumental principle (1B), and also accepts Raz’s conten-
tion that (1B) provides reasons, for a given end and means, both to take 
M and to abandon E (though no reason to do both).24 Should this in-
strumentalist claim, like Raz, that once she has abandoned the end of 
looking after her teeth, (1B) no longer provides her with a reason to go to 
the dentist? I can see no reason for her to think so, with one proviso. The 
proviso is that the example is not a case in which abandoning E changes 
the relationship between M and E so that M is no longer the necessary 
means to E for the agent in question. For an example of this sort, con-
sider a tightrope walker who intends to get to the other side by means of 
carefully placing one foot in front of the other. Suppose that, if this 
tightrope walker abandons his intention to get to the other side even 
momentarily, he will immediately lose his balance and fall. This tightrope 
walker loses his reason to carefully place one foot in front of the other if 
he abandons his intention to get to the other side, but only because his 
previous means of getting there will be ineffective as he plummets down 
from the wire. 
There may be some intuitive pull toward claiming that abandoning 
the end E causes one’s reason to take the means M to lapse, even in cases 
that meet the above proviso. But this pull arises from a logical scope 
                                                
21 This argument also shows that, if the wide-scope instrumental principle is true and 
there are (as Raz assumes there are) non-instrumental reasons to intend certain ends, we 
need not advert to a transmission principle like Raz’s Facilitative Principle to explain the 
existence of reasons to take the means to ends that we have decisive reasons to have. 
22 Of course, my having of ends and intentions may have effects that alter the terrain of 
my reasons in particular cases. For example, my abandoning my intention to look after 
my teeth may cause them to fall out, and I may thereby lose any further reason to look 
after them. I assume this is not the case in the present example. 
23 I thank two reviewers for JESP for pressing this question. 
24 This contention is accepted for the sake of argument; I will challenge it later. 
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confusion. What ought to be denied intuitively is that the instrumental 
principle (1B) provides me with a reason(to take the means and to not 
have the end). It is clearly true that I have no instrumental reason, in the 
present example, to both abandon the intention of looking after my teeth 
and visit the dentist. But to make this point is only to deny that I have a 
conjunctive reason. It is not to deny that I continue to have a pair of non-
conjunctive reasons, even after I have abandoned my intention.25 To see 
the distinction here, consider that while driving I may have both a reason 
to put my foot on the brake pedal and a reason to apply the handbrake 
(in each case, to prevent the car rolling down the hill). But this does not 
entail that I have any conjunctive reason(to put my foot on the brake and 
to apply the handbrake). I might, of course, have some further reason for 
doing both (e.g., because one of the brakes might fail), but my two sepa-
rate reasons do not on their own entail that I have a single, conjunctive 
reason to perform both actions. Similarly, then, in the dentist example, 
we may feel compelled to deny that I have any instrumental reason(to 
visit the dentist and abandon the intention to look after my teeth). But we 
can do this consistently with accepting that I have instrumental reason(to 
visit the dentist) and instrumental reason(to abandon the intention to 
look after my teeth). And assuming that the case meets the above proviso 
– that is, assuming that abandoning my intention to look after my teeth 
does not affect whether visiting the dentist remains the means to looking 
after my teeth – we have no grounds for thinking that abandoning the 
intention causes my reason to visit the dentist to lapse. Raz has no 
grounds for concluding in general that once one abandons one’s intention 
to pursue an end, one’s reason to take the means lapses. 
Raz’s explicit argument against the wide-scope approach is unravel-
ing already. He did not use the second, factual premise of the Detach-
ment Argument to produce his conclusion, but instead simply took the 
wide-scope instrumental principle and invoked DRD.26 The more general 
point to be drawn is that the wide-scope instrumental principle does not 
let us derive narrow-scope reasons that depend on our actual ends, there-
fore our actual ends do not give us reasons on account of it, and the 
Bootstrapping Problem does not arise. 
But perhaps my argument so far has only made the prospects for the 
wide-scope approach worse. If the premise that the end is actually intended 
plays no role in Raz’s argument, does the wide-scope instrumental princi-
ple entail narrow-scope reasons to take the means to all possible ends? The 
suggestion that we have such reasons is counterintuitive, at best, so I will 
call this the All Possible Ends Problem. 
 
                                                
25 Though I will provide different grounds for denying the claim that the instrumental 
principle generally provides pairs of narrow-scope reasons (see §§ 5–6). 
26 Broome also points out that the factual premise plays no role in Raz’s argument 
(Broome, “Have We Reason To Do As Rationality Requires?,” 5-6.) 
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4. Raz’s Argument Reformulated 
 
To show that the All Possible Ends Problem is not a serious threat to the 
wide-scope instrumental principle, I will need to show that the argument 
for deriving narrow-scope reasons from it still goes wrong, even if it does 
not attempt to invoke one’s actual ends. Here is a reformulation of Raz’s 
argument that clarifies it and drops the unnecessary reference to actual 
ends. If it were valid, it would show that if the wide-scope instrumental 
principle is true, then for any possible end one could intend, one both has 
reason to take the means, and reason not to intend the end: 
 
(1C) If M is the means to E, then one has reason(to M if one intends E).  
(2C) M is the means to E. 
From (1C) and (2C): 
(2.1C) One has reason(to M if one intends E). 
From (2.1C): 
(2.2C) One has reason((not to intend E) or (to M)). 
From (2.2C): 
(3) One has reason to M. 
(4) One has reason not to intend E. 
 
The first step in the argument is straightforward modus ponens, so to block 
the conclusions, I will argue that it is one of the steps from (2.1C) to 
(2.2C) or from the (2.2C) to (3) and (4) that is invalid. Recall that Raz 
reasoned informally that a wide-scope conditional reason claim like (2.1C) 
states a constraint, that there are two ways of satisfying it, and that there-
fore we have reason to do each, but not both, of those things. Raz’s 
argument here relies on two rules of inference, one that we may call the 
principle of Conditional Equivalence (CE), and another that looks much 
like the principle of Distribution of Reasons over Disjunction (DRD) that 
we met before: 
 
For the step from (2.1C) to (2.2C): 
 
 (CE) If one has a reason of the form: reason(If A then B), then one has 
a reason of the form: reason(not A or B). 
 
For the step from (2.2C) to (3) and (4): 
 
 (DRD*) If one has a reason of the form: reason(not A or B), then one 
has both a reason(not A) and a reason(B). 
 
Though DRD* looks very much like the earlier DRD, there is need for 
special care here, since Raz’s argument is written in English rather than in 
formal logic. After the next section, I will defend DRD*, but also show 
how DRD* is importantly different from DRD due to a difference in 
meaning between English “or” in this context and the logical disjunction 
operator. Before I move on to that point, a brief reductio will show that at 
least one of the two principles CE and DRD* must be rejected. 
 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 
IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE 
Simon Rippon 
 
 12 
5. Second Reply: A Reduct io  of the Reformulated Argument 
 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we all have a reason to speak the 
language of whichever country we are in. Suppose, moreover, that this 
reason is wide-scope in form.27 This is captured by the following princi-
ple: 
 
 (1L) If L is the language in C, then one has reason(to speak L if in C). 
 
By adding to (1L) an innocent minor premise and using Raz’s principles, 
we can now complete an argument structurally identical to the one above: 
 
(1L) If L is the language in C, then one has reason(to speak L if in C). 
(2L) French is the language in France. 
(2.1L) One has reason(to speak French if in France). 
(2.2L) One has reason(to not be in France or to speak French). 
(3L) One has reason to speak French. 
(4L) One has reason to not be in France. 
 
But the conclusions (3L) and (4L) are a highly implausible result of such 
meager premises – as a matter of fact I am in England, and have no 
particular reason to go to France! My embracing the principle that one 
has a reason to speak the language (1L) surely does not, on its own, 
commit me to the view that, here and now, I have a narrow-scope reason 
to speak French (nor, indeed, to not be in France). We must therefore 
reject at least one of Raz’s principles CE or DRD* that generate this 
form of argument. 
 
6. The Conjunctive Interpretation of “or” and Why It Matters 
 
The most natural understanding of wide-scope reason claims connected 
by the English “or” actually vindicates DRD*.28 Suppose I assert, in 
English, “I have reason to A or to B.” If this is to be understood as 
distinct from the narrow-scope reason claim: “I have reason(to A) or I 
have reason(to B)),” then it is best understood as true if and only if my 
doing each of A or B (but not both) would count as satisfying that reason. 
                                                
27 You might think that, if we do have a general reason to speak the language of the 
country we are in, it is a narrow-scope reason: Where L is the language in C, if one is in 
C, then one has reason to speak L. But understanding the reason in question as wide-
scope has the significant advantage of leaving open the question of whether, when 
applied to any particular country, the principle counts in favor of my (learning and) 
speaking the language, or in favor of my not being in (or not staying in) the relevant 
country. So a general wide-scope reason could explain, for example, both my having 
grounds to speak French should I visit France, and also my having, because Japanese is 
hard to learn, grounds to avoid being in Japan. (Of course, these grounds may not be 
decisive.) 
28 This point is a principal difference between my response to Raz and Broome’s own. 
Broome’s reply amounts to an attempt to refute Raz’s argument by denying DRD or 
DRD* (without distinguishing the two). My explanation of why DRD* holds for Eng-
lish sentences will explain why Raz might be tempted to accept the similar DRD, even 
though DRD is false. 
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Think of the instructions on a ready meal: “Microwave for 4 minutes, or 
oven bake for 30 minutes.” The instructions are best read as suggesting 
that I have a reason(to microwave or to bake) rather than (reason(to 
microwave) or reason(to bake)). I do not take a 50/50 gamble as to 
whether or not I act in accordance with the reasons the instructions 
present me with when I choose to microwave the meal! It is also not 
implausible to say that, when we say that I have this reason, I have rea-
son(to microwave) and reason(to bake), and reason not to do both (or at 
least, no reason from this consideration to do both). 
Here is another example: Suppose I am lost in a forest. I have been 
walking this way and that for hours and have no idea which way is which. 
Absent further information, I have good reason to choose a particular 
direction at random and then to keep walking in a straight line: this navi-
gational principle will give me the best chance of escaping the forest. Let 
us simplify and suppose that I can only choose to go either due north or 
due south (the other directions are presently blocked). My navigational 
reason can also be explained as a wide-scope reason connected by the 
English “or”: a reason(to walk north or to walk south). It is a reason to 
walk in each of these directions, but not more than one of them. In 
choosing to start walking in one particular direction, I will be taking a 
gamble about whether it is the shortest way out of the forest, and there-
fore – arguably – about whether I am walking in the direction I have 
most “objective” reason to take. But I will not be gambling about 
whether I am obeying the reason that my navigational principle provides 
me with; whichever direction I choose to walk in, that principle gives me 
a good reason to do so, and not to walk in various different directions. 
These examples indicate that, on the usual interpretation, wide-scope 
reason claims connected by the English “or” do indeed imply narrow-
scope reasons to perform the actions on either side of the connective, so 
DRD* is vindicated. But the acceptance of DRD* now gives us clear 
grounds for rejecting CE. Combining (1L) with the minor proposition 
(2L), we straightforwardly derived: (2.1L) One has reason(to speak 
French if in France). Intuitively, everything we have assumed so far is 
consistent with the assumption that, here and now in England, I have no 
reason whatsoever to speak French. But we have seen that the natural 
interpretation of: (2.2L) One has reason(to not be in France or to speak 
French) entails that I have a reason to speak French, and therefore con-
tradicts the last assumption. Therefore, (2.2L) cannot be entailed by 
(2.1L), and we must reject CE. 
To deny CE is to say that a wide-scope reason connected by the 
English “if … then” does not entail its apparent equivalent connected by 
the English “or.” That I have wide-scope reason to speak French if in 
France does not entail that I have a reason that can be properly repre-
sented in English as a “reason not to be in France or to speak French.” 
We know this because, on the narrow-scope reading, this last claim en-
tails that I have at least one of those reasons and, on the wide-scope 
reading, as we have seen, it entails that I have both! 
These results may appear to entail a denial of the intersubstitutivity 
of logical equivalents within the scope of the reason operator, and this 
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would be puzzling. A simpler explanation is that one of the English 
connectives involved is not translatable to its most obvious logical coun-
terpart, so that the two English sentences in question are not in fact 
logically equivalent. In fact, a wide-scope “reason to A or to B” as stated 
in English is not naturally interpreted as equivalent to a disjunctive rea-
son(to A ∨ to B) – where the connective is “ ∨ ”(read as vel), the logical 
disjunction operator. It is generally to be interpreted, rather, as equivalent 
to one of two conjunctions of reason claims: either to a reason(to A) & a 
reason(to B) & [from the contextually relevant consideration] no rea-
son(to A & to B) (e.g., as when one has reason to staple a sheaf of pages 
or use a paper clip, and no reason to do both), or to a reason(to A) & a 
reason(to B) & a reason not (to A & to B) (e.g., when one has reason to 
walk north or to walk south, and not alternately in each direction, when 
lost in the forest). This interpretation makes it obvious why DRD* is a 
useful rule of inference for wide-scope reason claims over the English 
“or”: since these claims have the logical form of a conjunction it is not 
surprising that, when they are true, their conjuncts are also true! 
There is, of course, no reason to think that a conditional reason such 
as reason(to B if not A) should entail a conjunction of reason claims like 
those just outlined, and this gives us clear grounds for rejecting CE: A 
wide-scope reason(to B if not A) is not equivalent to a wide-scope “rea-
son to A or to B,” where the latter is to be understood as suggested 
above. It is, rather, equivalent to a disjunctive reason(to A ∨ to B), a reason 
which is hard to state in a natural English sentence except as a condi-
tional, or else as the negation of a conjunction: “reason not (to not A and 
to not B).” 
My thesis about “or” may at first seem radical, but the idea that the 
English “or” in certain contexts should be interpreted as a logical con-
junction is nothing new: philosophers and linguists have long addressed it 
under the heading of “the problem of free choice permission.” This name 
comes from certain sentences granting permission, such as, “You can 
have milk or lemon in your tea,” which implies that you can have milk 
and you can have lemon but you cannot have both.29 The “problem” 
discussed is how to best explain the special interpretation of “or” needed 
in such contexts: as a feature of semantic meaning, as a pragmatic impli-
cature, or as something else. That concern is orthogonal to the present 
discussion: what is important here is just that sentences of this sort are 
generally understood as having such an import (whether semantic or 
pragmatic) – thus making us licensed, and liable, to draw certain infer-
ences from them that we should not draw from genuinely disjunctive 
claims. As far as I know, nobody has previously noticed the significance 
of conjunctive uses of “or” in the deontic contexts in which I detect 
them here. 
Making use of the conjunctive interpretation of the English “or” al-
lows us to continue to understand the reason operator as functioning 
                                                
29 Ralph Wedgwood helpfully raised this example in his commentary on an earlier 
version of this paper. 
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logically in ordinary ways. If we substitute the logical “ ∨ ” for the Eng-
lish “or” in CE and DRD* we can then accept the principle: 
 
(CE*) If one has a reason of the form reason(If A then B), then one has a reason 
of the form reason(not A ∨ B). 
 
CE* is either a simple instance of substitution of logical equivalents, or an 
entailment between an English conditional that is stronger than the mate-
rial conditional and the disjunctive logical equivalent of the material 
conditional. It is, therefore, difficult to deny from a logical point of view. 
Let us return to our near-relative of DRD*, the principle of Distribu-
tion of Reasons over Disjunction: 
 
(DRD) If one has a reason of the form: reason(not A ∨ B), then one has both a 
reason(not A) and a reason(B). 
 
It is the principle we came across first when Raz took himself to make 
use of it in the Detachment Argument. I will now argue that we should 
deny it. There is an alethic modal analogy we can use to show that deny-
ing DRD is not prima facie implausible. From: necessarily(p ∨ not p), it 
does not follow that the disjunction of narrow-scope modals (necessarily 
(p) ∨ necessarily (not p)) is true; similarly from: reason(A ∨ B), it need not 
follow that the disjunction of narrow-scope reasons (reason(A) ∨ rea-
son(B)) is true, let alone that the conjunction of these narrow-scope reasons 
is true.30 
More importantly, the denial of DRD is supported by the threat of a 
reductio similar to the one I already provided: I could surely be committed 
to the claim (2.1L) that one has reason to speak the local language (in 
general) without being committed to thinking, here and now, that I have 
any narrow-scope reasons at all to speak French, or to not be in France. But 
we have accepted CE*, and if CE* and DRD were both true, such nar-
row-scope reasons would be entailed by the wide-scope claim. This gives 
us sufficient grounds for denying DRD.31 Wide-scope reasons like (2.1L) 
do not on their own provide us with narrow-scope reasons, so DRD 
must be false. 
 
                                                
30 The analogy with the modal necessity operator should not be taken too far: in contrast 
with it, agglomeration is not permissible, i.e., (reason(to A) and reason(to B)) does not 
entail reason(to A and to B). The reason operator is analogous to the modal possibility 
operator in this respect. 
31 Astute readers may notice that, according to my foregoing arguments, the claim (2.1L) 
may entail that I have a reason, here and now, to speak French: it will do so if I have a 
reason to be in France that does not conflict with the reason given by (2.1L). This may 
seem implausible at first, but it will not seem so implausible if we realize that my com-
bined reason is just a reason, here and now, to be in France and speak French. It will not do 
anything for my acting in accordance with (2.1L) if I speak French here and now in 
England. Doing so will be superfluous to making true the disjunction (speak French   
not be in France), since that disjunction is already true, and it will additionally falsify 
another disjunction that (2.1L) equally gives me a reason to satisfy: (speak English   not 
be in England). 
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7. Understanding Wide-Scope Conditional Reasons 
 
We are finally in a position to finish up our reply to Raz in the following 
way: to say that one has a wide-scope conditional reason is to say that one 
has a reason not to do both of the things that make the antecedent true 
and the consequent false. But this is not to say that one has reasons to do 
each (but not both) of making the consequent true and falsifying the 
antecedent, nor indeed to say that one has either of those narrow-scope 
reasons. It is only to say that one has a wide-scope disjunctive reason(to 
make the antecedent false ∨ to make the consequent true). This reason 
need not entail the existence of any narrow-scope reasons. The cause of 
mistakenly thinking otherwise is that the natural way to try to express the 
disjunctive reason claim in English is to say that “one has reason to make 
the antecedent false or the consequent true.” But to make this claim, on 
the natural wide-scope interpretation of it, is to change the subject by 
making a claim about a conjunction of narrow-scope reasons. It is to mistakenly 
think of the wide-scope disjunctive reason as in every case giving us 
“options,” when in fact it does no such thing. 
In showing that CE and DRD must be rejected, I have shown that 
the argument for deriving simple narrow-scope reasons to take the means 
to any end from the wide-scope instrumental principle fails (or at least, 
that it fails absent an additional normative premise, such as a premise that 
there is reason to intend the end). This point therefore successfully de-
fends the wide-scope instrumental principle against both the All Possible 
Ends Problem and the Bootstrapping Problem. 
 
8. Generalizing the Lesson: Against Liberal Transmission and the 
Facilitative Principle 
 
I suggested earlier that Raz might rest both DRD and the Facilitative 
Principle on a more general principle, the Liberal Transmission principle, 
that says: If you have reason to bring about A, and you can bring about 
A either by doing B or by doing C, then you have reason to do B and you 
have reason to do C (but no reason to do both). In denying DRD, I am 
committed to denying Liberal Transmission as well; I am claiming that 
you can have a reason to bring about the truth of a disjunction without 
having any particular reasons to bring about the truth of each of the 
disjuncts, even though either action would be sufficient to bring about 
the truth of the disjunction. If the Facilitative Principle is derived from 
Liberal Transmission, the argument that undermines DRD serves to 
undermine the grounds for the Facilitative Principle as well. But in any 
case, all three principles can be seen as motivated by the same informal 
argument that trades on a confusion about the logical form of wide-scope 
reason sentences connected by the English “or”: 
 
(1) You have reason to do A. 
(2) You can do A by doing B or by doing C. 
(3) ⇒ You have reason(to do B or to do C). 
(4) ⇒ You have reason to do each of B and C, but not both. 
(5) ⇒ You have reason to do B & You have reason to do C. 
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It is the step from (3) to (4) that invokes the special conjunctive interpre-
tation of the English “or.”32 If we understand that “or” in step (3) as a 
true disjunction, there is no way to derive step (4) from it. If, alternatively, 
we understand it in the way I have described, as a conjunction, there is no 
way to derive it from premises (1) and (2). 
That there is no way to derive step (4) from the disjunctive interpre-
tation of (3) follows from the more general truth that you can have rea-
son to do something even if you do not have reason to do it in each and 
every one of the possible ways in which it can be done. I have already 
suggested that one’s reason to take the means to one’s ends should be 
understood in this spirit, but it is also supported by our intuitions about 
many other ordinary claims about the reasons that we have. For example, 
I may have reason to crack a joke at dinner, without having any reason to 
crack a racist, sexist and otherwise generally offensive one. I may have a 
reason to go to the party and have a drink, without having any reason to 
go to the party and have a drink of petrol.33 In other cases, some ways of 
doing what we have reason to do would quite explicitly defeat the pur-
pose of doing it: I may have reason to get some money in order to buy a 
lottery ticket, but I have no reason do it by selling my existing lottery 
ticket. 
Reflection on such examples indicates that it is not the case that hav-
ing reason to do something entails having reason to do it in each of the 
possible ways there is of doing it. Nor is it the case that having undefeated 
reason to do something (as Raz puts it in his statement of the Facilitative 
Principle) entails that you have reason to perform each possible plan that 
would facilitate its performance. My thesis about how the conjunctive 
“or” in a wide-scope reason claim may be confused with a logical disjunc-
tion provides a debunking explanation for why philosophers have been 
tempted to think otherwise. The present argument thus undermines Raz’s 
argument for the Facilitative Principle as well as his objection to the 
wide-scope reasons approach. 
The argument I have laid out also makes a more radical claim about 
the relationship between wide-scope and narrow-scope reasons. It is not 
merely the case that you can have a reason to do something without 
having a reason to do it in each possible particular way in which it could 
be done; it is also the case that you can have a reason to do something 
without having a reason to do it in any possible particular way in which it 
could be done. That is to say, you could still have a reason(to A ∨ to B) 
                                                
32 The conjunctive “or” may be present in premise (2) as well, but its presence or 
absence there makes no difference to the following argument. 
33 It may be possible to bite the bullet about these examples and say that one does have 
some reason to do these things, though the reasons to do them are small and massively 
outweighed. Mark Schroeder offers an interesting pragmatic account of why it may 
sound odd to assert the existence of reasons that are small and massively outweighed in 
his Slaves of the Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). However, it would 
seem at least prima facie preferable to take our intuitions about the non-existence of the 
relevant reasons at face value. 
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even if you had no reason(to A) and no reason(to B). This is because 
your wide-scope reason to make it the case that a disjunction is true need 
not arise from, or be accompanied by, any particular reasons for making 
either of the disjuncts true; it would still be true even if the only reason 
you have is some reason not to both (not A & not B). 
My claim that you can have a wide-scope disjunctive reason while 
lacking any narrow-scope reasons is not, of course, to be equated with the 
paradoxical claim that a disjunction could be true without either of its 
disjuncts being true. The disjunction is embedded here within the scope 
of the reason operator, so there should be no air of paradox about it. It is 
analogous to the familiar claim about modal necessity: necessarily(p ∨ not 
p) may be true even though neither necessarily(p) nor necessarily(not p) is 
true. But I want to draw a yet closer analogy that wide-scope reasons bear 
to wide-scope requirements. In the case of requirements, it is quite clear 
that one can be subject to a wide-scope requirement without being sub-
ject to any narrow-scope requirements. For this reason, a version of Raz’s 
detachment argument that was applied to a wide-scope requirement 
would have been implausible on its face. Suppose, for example, that I am 
subject to no reasons and requirements but a single wide-scope disjunc-
tive requirement that I recognize: I am required(to A ∨ to B). Then my 
doing either A or B may be motivated by the thought that I am required 
to do it. Suppose I do A. Then it would be misleading to explain my 
motivation by saying that I was required to do precisely what I did; I was 
rather required(to A ∨ to B). This can be shown by the fact that, if I had 
recognized myself to be under two requirements – the one mentioned 
already and a second, narrow-scope requirement to A – and supposing 
that it were only possible for me to perform one of A or B, and I knew 
this, then I would not have been able to B and rationally be motivated by 
the thought that I was required to do it. 
The same goes for wide-scope reasons. Suppose, for example, that I 
am subject to no reasons and requirements but a single wide-scope dis-
junctive reason that I recognize: I have reason(to A ∨ to B). Then my 
doing either A or B may be motivated by the thought that I have reason 
to do it. Suppose I do A. Then it would be misleading to explain my 
motivation by saying that I had reason to do precisely what I did; I rather 
had reason(to A ∨ to B). It follows that wide-scope disjunctive reasons or 
requirements need not entail the existence of narrow-scope reasons or 
requirements, and may be acted upon rationally even so. 
The instrumental principle should, I believe, be understood in the 
way I have outlined here. We should not think that the existence of a 
reason to take the means to your ends depends on or entails either your 
having any reasons for taking particular means, or your having any rea-
sons for not having particular ends. This is because it is plausible that 
your reason to take the means to your ends is ultimately just a reason of 
instrumental rationality: a wide-scope reason governing combinations of 
attitudes, or actions and attitudes, and not a reason of any other kind. 
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9. The Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle and “Process” Reasons 
 
The account of wide-scope reasons presented here enables us to respond 
to an additional objection to the wide-scope approach that has been 
developed in detail by Niko Koldony.34 Koldony speaks in terms of 
(rational) “requirements,” but I will translate his objection into the lan-
guage of “reasons” in order to address a potential argument that might be 
made against the principle defended here. Kolodny argues that the re-
quirements of rationality are not “state” but “process” requirements, 
where state requirements require you to be a certain way, whereas process 
requirements require you to do something over a period of time. Process 
requirements, Kolodny says, can be normative in the sense that they “can 
function as advice or guide your deliberation,” whereas state requirements 
“cannot be normative in this sense, since they do not tell you to do any-
thing. At most, state requirements might be evaluative requirements – 
that is, necessary conditions for qualifying for a certain kind of ap-
praisal.”35 Translated into the language of reasons, we might say that state 
reasons are reasons to be a certain way, whereas process reasons are 
reasons to do things over time. If he wished to advocate the parallel 
distinction among reasons, Kolodny might say that, whereas process 
reasons can function as advice or guide your deliberation by counting in 
favor of a certain course of action, state reasons can only count in favor 
of making a certain kind of appraisal. 
Kolodny’s analysis leaves us with two competing readings of my 
wide-scope instrumental principle, depending on which function it is 
intended to play. In terms of state reasons, it would then be expressed as: 
 
(WS) You have reason to not be in the following state: that you intend E but will 
not take M. 
 
In terms of process reasons, it would be expressed as: 
 
(WP) You have reason to avoid or exit, in whatever way you like, the following state: 
that you intend E but will not take M.36 
 
The objection to my wide-scope instrumental principle then proceeds as 
follows: If we are interested in describing the instrumental reasons that 
we have to do things, then neither of these interpretation of the wide-
scope instrumental can be satisfactory. That task should interest us in 
process reasons, rather than state reasons, and therefore in WP in particu-
lar. A man who, upon recognizing a necessary means to his ends, consis-
tently abandons his ends, satisfies WP – but he is not a good example of 
                                                
34 See Niko Kolodny, “Why Be Rational?,” Mind 114, no. 455 (July 1, 2005): 509-563; 
Niko Kolodny, “State or Process Requirements?,” Mind 116, no. 462 (April 2007): 371-
385. See also the reply by John Broome, “Wide or Narrow Scope?,” Mind 116, no. 462 
(April 1, 2007): 359-370. 
35 Kolodny, “State or Process Requirements?,” 371-72. 
36 The alternative readings here closely parallel those of a rational requirement given by 
Kolodny in “State or Process Requirements?,” 372. 
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an instrumentally rational agent. So WP is too liberal an interpretation of 
the instrumental process reasons that we have.37 
This argument threatens to force us to abandon the wide-scope read-
ing of the instrumental principle when it is intended as a guide to action. 
But the discussion of this paper shows why WP need not be accepted as 
the proper interpretation of the wide-scope instrumental principle even in 
terms of process reasons. As I argued above, you can have reason to 
make a disjunction true without having reason to make each of its dis-
juncts true. Therefore, if we wanted to represent wide-scope instrumental 
principle explicitly as a process reason, part of WP should be omitted, 
and it should rather be presented as: 
 
(WP2) You have reason to avoid or exit the following state: that you intend E but 
will not take M. 
 
The crucial point here is that WP2 does not imply that you have any 
reason to not intend E, nor any reason to take M. It says you have a 
reason simply to avoid or exit a certain state. While it is, of course, neces-
sary that you either not intend E or take M in order that you avoid or exit 
the state, and you do have reason to avoid or exit the state, according to 
WP2, it does not follow that you have reason to do either of these things 
in particular. This is just what my denial of DRD, of Raz’s Facilitative 
Principle, and of Liberal Transmission implies. You can have undefeated 
reason to do something even if you do not have reason to do it in every 
possible way in which it can be done. 
Using WP2 rather than WP as our interpretation of the wide-scope 
instrumental principle allows us to respond to the example of a man who 
consistently abandons his intentions upon recognizing the necessary 
means to them. Such a man does indeed, in every particular case, avoid or 
exit the state of intending E but not taking M. But we can glean no in-
formation from WP2 alone about whether, in every such case, he avoids 
or exits the state in a particular way in which he has a reason to avoid or 
exit it. Given certain widely shared background assumptions about what 
we have reason to do, people have undefeated reason to intend certain 
ends. As I argued earlier, such reasons would combine with our wide-
scope instrumental reasons (here expressed as WP2) to provide us with 
reason to take the means to those ends. And this explains the intuition 
that there is something imperfectly rational about someone who consis-
tently abandons his intentions on recognizing the necessary means to 
them. 
It might be objected that there is something defective about WP2 
understood as a statement of process reasons, because when considered 
on its own it does not tell us which particular actions we have a reason to 
perform. But it is difficult to see why we should accept any such con-
straint on what counts as a legitimate statement of a process reason. In 
general, when we describe our reasons, we properly ignore various ways 
in which we have no reason to act that the specified reason may seem 
                                                
37 I thank a reviewer for JESP for pressing this objection. 
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superficially to count in favor of. If you tell me I have a reason to go to 
London, it is no objection to point out that I have no reason to crawl 
there on my hands and knees. 
 
10. The Promise of the Wide-Scope Approach 
 
The wide-scope reasons approach is, I believe, worth defending. It offers 
a simple and unitary explanation of why instrumental irrationality is 
something that can be criticized whether or not the agent has reason to 
have, or not have, the end he does. Someone who intends an end but 
does not take the means to it does not act in accordance with the wide-
scope reasons that he has. He fails to make it the case that, if he intends 
the end, he takes the means. “Instrumental reasons” are best conceived 
of as wide-scope reasons, rather than narrow-scope reasons to take the 
means to our ends, or to the ends that we should have. That way, we can 
say that all instrumentally irrational agents act against their instrumental 
reasons. 
Since we did not need to derive any narrow-scope reasons either 
from the agent’s actual ends or from the ends he ought to have in order 
to know that he has violated his reasons, this account of instrumental 
rationality does not require “transmission” of normative force from ends 
to means. It is conceivable, on this account, that agents in fact have wide-
scope instrumental reasons and no other reasons whatsoever. It is con-
ceivable, therefore, that rationality is purely instrumental. 
An important question remains: why think that we actually have the 
wide-scope reasons expressed by the instrumental principle? I have not 
attempted to answer this question here. But I have cleared away a prob-
lem that made answering it seem impossible from the get-go: I have 
shown why the instrumental principle, read as a schema for wide-scope 
instrumental reasons, is a credible account of at least some of the reasons 
that we take ourselves to have. 
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